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Periodically, Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership formally issues Layeha or ‘codes of conduct’
for their fighters and supporters. Layeha offer important insights into the Afghan Taliban’s
objectives, strategies and the psyche/perspective of Taliban leadership. This article presents
an analysis of the Taliban’s code of conduct and examines what Layeha tell us about
Taliban objectives, strategy and organization. Such information would seem particularly
important as the United States as well as its coalition allies assess their Afghan operational
strategy as well as exit strategy from Afghanistan. This analysis of the Layeha suggests that
the Taliban remain most concerned with: chain of command principles preventing the
fragmentation of the various Taliban networks; obtaining and maintaining public support by
winning ‘hearts and minds’ of local residents; ensuring enough fighters remain engaged in
combat; and galvanizing the perception that the Taliban represent a capable, desirable and
fair alternative to the current Afghan political establishment.
Keywords: Taliban Layeha; information operations; Taliban organization and leadership;
Taliban ‘shadow government’
Introduction
While there is rich scholarly literature concerning the Taliban1, little has been written pertaining
to the Taliban’s Layeha or the ‘codes of conduct’ that the Taliban periodically issue to their
cadres. We argue that although there are clearly limitations in the analytical use of Taliban
Layeha – aspects of these documents are partly related to a kind of public-relations or infor-
mation-operations exercise2 – these codes of conduct clearly offer clues concerning the
psyche and perspectives of Taliban leadership as well as insights as to how the Taliban see them-
selves and their organization. As Marshall McLuhan (2005) famously said: ‘The medium is the
message’.
What the Taliban have presented in their most recent Layeha is at variance with the usual
media or political assessments of the Taliban’s strategic positions and tactics. This document
conveys a sense of urgency and offers details as to how the Taliban, as an organization, plan
to pursue their short-term objectives.3 The Taliban continue to expand4 but struggle to maintain
their command and control authority as well as their ‘ideals’ and ‘core principles’. While the
Taliban’s shadow justice and governmental systems have met with considerable success in
parts of the country, the movement, at least at the tactical and district level, seems to be suffering
from a variety of negative dynamics including greed, predatory behaviour and criminality. Self-
prescribed treatment for these dilemmas, if the latest Layeha is to be believed, comes in the form
of consolidation, loyalty, obedience, structure, professionalism, tolerance, lawfulness and unity.
This article examines what Layeha tell us about Taliban objectives, strategy and organiz-
ation.5 This article is premised on the assumption that deconstructing the latest version of the
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Layeha provides important clues into the Taliban’s organization following the capture of several
of its political and military elite in 2009 and 2010, as well as other recent changes in the organ-
ization. For example, the rise to power of younger, more aggressive and militarily capable com-
manders such as Mullah Abdul Qauyum Zakir and his deputy Mullah Abdul Rauf Alizai and
their power struggle with old-guard Taliban leadership is partially evidenced in the latest
Layeha that will be assessed by this article.
Layeha of 29 May 2010
The Taliban first issued their code of conduct manifesto in Spring 2006. They reissued the code
in May 2009 and again in late May 2010. The Taliban’s most recent code of conduct6 is signifi-
cantly different from the 2009 edition. The May 2010 Layeha includes major modifications
including an additional chapter and 18 new ‘articles’ (rules). Moreover, the reissuing of the
Layeha comes at an important juncture in the Afghan conflict, especially in light of
the seizure and detention of several leading Taliban leaders since January 2010, including the
‘Deputy Imam’, Mullah Abdul Ghani ‘Berader’, who, interestingly, was mentioned seven
times in the 2009 Layeha.7 It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Taliban Quetta
shura following a series of high-profile arrests and the targeted killings of ‘365 high-ranking
and mid-level insurgent commanders mid-level Taliban leaders’ (Gebauer 2010) between
May and August 2010 has prompted many of the changes observed in the newest Layeha. It
is also interesting to note that the largely absent voice of Mullah Omar had become more appar-
ent by the autumn of 2010, possibly signalling that some commanders have lost (or are losing)
faith in the Taliban’s supreme leadership (Yousafzai and Moreau 2010). The ultimate role of
Omar in the operational and strategic posture of the Taliban is critical to a whole series of
issues including the feasibility of Taliban negotiation and/or reconciliation with the Kabul
regime. Negotiation and reconciliation has become a major focus of Kabul as well as within
certain sectors of the US policy community.
Although the publication of the Layeha is perceived among some Western analysts as pol-
itical theatre, the document does provide important clues as to how the Taliban intend to operate
in the developing security environment, as well as how the movement has recently been restruc-
tured – all according to the Taliban’s leadership perspective. As will be seen below, the docu-
ment reveals the Taliban’s attempt to wage a guerrilla campaign in concert with a rudimentary
population-centric strategy – including the important creation of a complaints commission – a
shura that investigates suspected abuse of Afghan civilians by Taliban leaders and their fighters.
It appears that the Taliban have become particularly sensitive to local perceptions and increas-
ingly rely upon traditional ‘population-centric’ lines of operation to consolidate their battle for
‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan populace and especially the southern, rural, Pashtun (Johnson
2007b, Nathan 2008, 2009, Johnson and Waheed 2011).
As in the past, the Taliban remain conscious, and vulnerable, to actual and perceived damage
done to the movement’s political capital by the incorporation of criminals (Taliban-e duzd) into
the movement during the ‘open-door’ recruitment policies enacted in 2003, and this is reflected
in the Layeha. Infighting among Taliban factions is another key concern, something that has
been recorded steadily over the past few years.8 The Taliban are exerting tremendous efforts
to rectify issues concerning abuse and criminal activity by Taliban commanders and, as will
be seen below, have dedicated several new articles in the Layeha to address these issues.
Tribal and communal conflicts are also of particular concern, and the Taliban have exerted
efforts to mitigate these issues by creating effective mediation council and dispute-resolution
mechanisms, usually termed ‘shadow courts’, which are critical in achieving local support
and sympathies (Carter and Clark 2010). The 2010 Layeha pays particular attention to the



























importance of these judiciary councils that theoretically outline the accepted way for Taliban
fronts to create, utilize and manage their organizational behaviour.
Methodology
The analysis of the Layeha presented below is based on a qualitative content analysis of the 2009
and 2010 documents. This analysis was primarily interested in categorizing and comparing the
statements presented in each of the two most recently published Layeha. Particular research
attention was devoted to analysing differences in content and themes of these documents. The
Table of Contents of each document was carefully compared and similar sections were system-
atically assessed in an effort to identify changes in scope, intent and focus. This analysis was
then complemented with previously obtained documents, including interviews with top
Taliban leaders published in jihadist leaflets, magazines and websites, as well as the Layeha
of 2006. The research objective was to assess changes as well as similarities in the Taliban’s
own statements as presented in the two manifestos concerning their strategy, tactics and goals.9
Before presenting the content analysis of the May 2010 Layeha and its comparison with the
2009 ‘code of conduct’, we first compare the structure of the 2010 document with its predeces-
sor. We will then present our analysis of the 2010 Layeha and compare it to the 2009 document.
Finally, we will examine the Taliban’s organizational construct as presented in the 2010 Layeha.
This organizational case study will demonstrate how the Taliban have adopted portions of the
Layeha in actual practice.
Structure of the 2010 Layeha as compared to the 2009 Manifesto
Table 1 presents a first-order comparison of the Tables of Contents of the 2010 and 2009 Layeha.
The code of conduct manual offers a structured approach using a chapter format with numbered
Table 1. Table of content analysis of 2010 and 2009 Layeha
2010 Layeha 2009 Layeha
1. Decisions Pertaining to the Surrender of
Opponents and Giving Invitations to Them;
2. Regarding Prisoners;
3. Regarding Spies;
4. Enemy’s Logistics and Construction
Activities;
5. Captured Enemy Equipment (War Booty);
6. Regarding Commissions (i.e., Mujahedeen
Organization);
7. Internal (Personal) Issues of Mujahedeen;
8. Education and Training;
9. About Departments and Companies;
10. Health Related Issues;
11. National Issues;
12. Prohibited Items (Forbiddance);
13. Advice;
14. Recommendations about the Code of
Conduct.
15. The conclusion is marked by a small speech





4. Enemy’s Logistics and Construction
Activities;
5. Captured Enemy Equipment;
6. Mujahedeen Organization;
7. Mujahedeen Personal Issues;
8. Education and Training;
9. Regarding Mujahedeen Organization;
10. Local Personnel Topics;
11. Prohibited Items;
12. Recommendations and Focus Regarding
These Rules and Regulations;
13. The conclusion is summarized by a poetic
statement by Mullah Mohammad Omar titled,
God Give Us Victory.



























‘articles’ listed below each chapter subheading. As evidenced in Table 1, the Tables of Contents
of the two documents are very similar. Ten of the 14 2010 section topics are the same as 2009.
New topics suggested by the 2010 Table of Content as compared to the 2009 document are:
. Decisions Pertaining to the Surrender of Opponents and Giving Invitations to Them;
. Health Related Issues;
. National Issues; and
. Advice.
While many of the sections of the new Layeha are similar to the 2009 document, the 2010
Layeha nevertheless represents a significant expansion of instructions (although not necessarily
a replacement) as compared to the originally released 2006 Taliban Layeha.10 The 2009 Layeha
is mentioned in the foreword of the Taliban’s much longer 2010 code of conduct, a version that
contains 14 chapters and 85 articles (or rules).11 In the 2010 Layeha, the Taliban leadership asks
its cadres to abandon all previous modes of operational doctrine, including the 2009 Layeha, and
abide by the new set of rules established within the code of conduct.
Table 2 presents an overview of the thematic changes evidenced in the 2010 Layeha as com-
pared to the 2009 version. As suggested in this table, out of the 85 articles in the 2010 Layeha, 47
were repeated from the 2009 Layeha, 14 were modified/altered and 24 were new (18 of which
are new additions; six additional articles replace the omissions from the 2009 Layeha). At least
17 out of the original 30 Layeha were repeated in the 2009 manifesto. An analysis was under-
taken to focus on the types of variations found in the Taliban’s latest iteration of the Layeha (as
compared to earlier versions). We posit that this assessment provides insight into the Taliban’s
overall strategic shifts, alterations in Taliban command-and-control structures, and the Taliban’s
perceived adaptation to the on-going and fluid security environment unfolding in Afghanistan.
Similar to the US military-force structure in Afghanistan, the Taliban have undergone serious
leadership changes between 2009 and 2010; these changes, many caused by Coalition operations
against senior leadership elements as well as some arrests of senior Taliban leadership in
Pakistan, have had a seemingly significant impact on the Taliban’s group cohesion and political
objectives. An examination of the 2010 Layeha strongly reflects these dynamics relative to
thematic changes in the document.
Analysis of 2010 Layeha
The current edition, as previously suggested, is much longer and covers in greater detail more
strategic and tactical concerns than the earlier Layeha. Significant additions were made to
Table 2. Overview of 2010 Layeha thematic changes
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Chapter seven (‘Internal Issues of the Mujahedeen’) with 10 new articles added, in addition a
new chapter, (Chapter 10) entitled ‘Health Related Issues’ was published.12
While suggestions that the Taliban are attempting to adhere to more moderate behaviour by
the issuing of an explicit code of conduct may be applicable in certain regions, such as Sangin
district in Helmand, where the Taliban shadow governor was replaced several times last year
because of brutality (Williams 2010), this is clearly not universally recognized or followed by
all Taliban and Taliban groups. Code stipulations such as ‘protection offered to any government
official, worker or contractor captured by the Taliban’, have been cited to suggest a ‘softer,
kinder’ Taliban is not a new doctrine.13 This rule was previously outlined in the Taliban’s
2006 Layeha and is a widely accepted tenet of Pashtunwali.14 Obscene battlefield atrocities,
such as beheadings, the murdering of women and the mutilation of Afghans working for the gov-
ernment and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are still occurring. The Taliban
have repeated their prohibition against cutting ‘ears, nose, and lips’ [Chapter 12, Article 70 of
2010 Layeha]. However, in practice, some Taliban have continued the practice of mutilating
Afghan citizens, severing ears and noses, and often beheading Afghan villagers (including
women) and security forces.15 The Taliban leadership has made an appeal to end this unpopular
battlefield conduct, heinous examples of which are the carving out of a villager’s eyes in Kan-
dahar province in 2008 and the execution of a pregnant woman in Badghis province in August
2010 (Shirmohammadi 2010). Such actions continue to be a major bane to the Taliban’s political
capital.
The content analysis of the main themes of the 2010 code of conduct suggests that the main
purpose of the reissuing of the Layeha in light of the restructuring of the Taliban’s leadership
infrastructure was:
. A continued focus on network communication, consolidation and control;
. A focus on the quality of jihadist operations;
. A recognition of the importance of public support for their movement;
. To ensure jihadist operations do not negatively impact the Taliban’s public support;
. An attempt to convince the local population that the Taliban – not the local Afghan gov-
ernment, local security force, local militia or even a rival insurgent faction (for example,
Hezb-i-Islami) – is the real power in that specific region.
. To properly convey the new organization of the Taliban provincial leadership; namely the
importance and structure of political commissions, the Taliban’s proverbial ‘silver bullet’
in defeating the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) by creating
an effective and legitimate parallel government that responds to the social, political and
security needs of the people;
. To incentivize Afghan Government personnel to defect to the Taliban. For example,
rewards are offered (as well as introductions to ‘high-ranking mujahedeen’) if one kills
a high-ranking government official or coalition soldier or if an individual’s actions
create an environment where the Taliban can kill a high-ranking official or coalition
forces; and
. To loosen the command-and-control parameters on executing captured government offi-
cials, clerics, commanders and elders.
The 2010 manual’s target audience appears to be provincial and district leadership (many of
the Layeha are specifically directed at them), and stresses the importance of obedience and the
chain of command in conjunction with the larger Taliban administrative bodies (provincial com-
missions). The 2009 version focused more on ‘group leaders’ – tactical-level Taliban comman-
ders in charge of dilgai (local cadres) numbering 10–15 men. The most recent document
outlines the organizational responsibilities of both the district and provincial-level command



























apparatuses. Interestingly, the 2010 Layeha refers only scantily to the Taliban’s supreme leader-
ship, Mullah Muhammad Omar (Amir ul-Momineen)16 and his Deputy, who goes unnamed,
unlike the 2009 version where Omar’s then most-trusted deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani
Berader, was referred to frequently.17 Mullah Omar and his deputy are both referred to six
times in the 2010 manifesto; in earlier versions Mullah Omar was referred to 11 times and
Berader seven times.
Significant differences: 2010 vs. 2009 doctrine
Although the Taliban have incorporated more than half of the prior Layeha into their new mani-
festo, it is important to note which rules were modified or removed altogether in assessing their
evolving strategy, operations and tactics. Additionally, which rules were added – namely
additional caveats and explicit details to particular rule sets (that is, more detailed rules for pris-
oners, the creation of provincial commissions and dividing war booty) – also warrants a close
examination.
Actions prohibited by the Taliban (Chapter 12) remain basically unchanged from the 2006,
2009 and 2010 Layeha except for this important modification:
. 2010, Article 69: ‘Youngsters (those without beards) are prohibited from living in muja-
hidin residencies or administrative centres.’
. 2009, Article 50: ‘Youngsters (those without beards) are not allowed to be taken for jihad.’
The importance in this modification is not so much the Taliban’s acceptance of child-
soldiers, but the prohibition of their use of Taliban sleeping quarters. Male-on-male sexual
activity, especially that of man-on-child abuse (known locally as bachabauzi, or ‘child’s
play’), is a practice that has allegedly rose to prominence throughout the past 30 years of con-
flict.18 Most Afghans view bachabauzi as a grave social injustice; the Taliban, for example,
prides itself on the widely held narrative that the event that prompted Mullah Omar and his
small band of talibs to originally take up arms against the warlords was the tank duel
between two Kandahari commanders who were fighting over the right to own a young
dancing boy (Rashid 2001, p. 25). The issue is so contentious that Afghan laws also prohibit
the young from dwelling in Afghan police and military barracks.
Kidnapping and the criminalization of the Taliban remains a major vulnerability to the
Taliban organization, especially as perceived by certain Afghan communities (Gopal 2010,
pp. 14, 20, 37–38, van Bijlert 2010, p. 16). Article 73 of the 2010 document expressly prohibits
kidnapping for ransom. The continued focus on kidnapping and other criminal activities in the
Layeha would seem to suggest that senior Taliban leadership is fully aware of the negative reac-
tions felt by local communities regarding the movement’s involvement in kidnappings, extor-
tion, mutilations, bribery and attacking educational institutions and students. Nevertheless,
2010 witnessed a major increase in kidnappings in Kandahar City and other locations.19 It
seems strikingly apparent that the Taliban organization has had severe problems with banditry,
extortion, bribery and criminality within their ranks. In 2010, the scholar of Afghanistan Martine
van Biljret noted how some Afghans refer to the Taliban in Zabul province as the ‘thief Taliban’.
Van Biljret’s (2010, p. 16) research suggests that these Taliban are driven by personal economic
gain and are less ideologically motivated than the Taliban in other areas. There seems little doubt
that opportunistic predatory behaviour in certain areas is interfering with Taliban tactics and
strategy and corrupting the organization from the district level on up, probably infecting
provincial-level leadership as well.20 Media reports have speculated about a financial drain of
the ‘central treasury’ that was partially caused by corrupt and greedy tactical- and district-
level commanders. It is further believed that these Taliban commanders have helped bleed



























resources for their own self-interests. This, in turn, has caused inner-Taliban rivalries based on
economic domination of specific territories, specifically within Zabul Province (Moreau 2009),
although evidence of this phenomenon exists in nearly all areas where insurgent groups are
operating.
References to financial matters as well as extortion appear in several other rules of the 2009
manifesto as well as the 2010 document:
. ‘Taking money in order to forgive someone is prohibited’;
. ‘When we mention that we need a ‘guarantee’ from someone, we are saying that a trusted
person should provide a guarantee. We are not talking about property or money’;
. ‘When you capture drivers, contractors, or soldiers, releasing them for money is
prohibited’;
. ‘If an Afghan National Army soldier is captured, the Imam or Imam’s Assistant will make
the decision on whether to kill him, to use him for a prisoner exchange, or exchange him
for money.’21
In Pashtunwali, money is often used as a means of settling disputes, or forgiving a transgres-
sion between individuals or clans. Such transactions have been an important ingredient of con-
flict resolution in the Afghanistan region for hundreds of years (Caroe 1958, Spain 1961, 1962,
Ahemed 1980, DuPree 1980, Glatzer 1998). Indeed, Afghanistan’s customary criminal norms
are based on restorative rather than retributive justice.22 In Pashtun communities this means a
culprit is asked to pay poar, or compensation money, to the victim or the victim’s family and
to ask for forgiveness rather than spend time in a prison. This underlying custom of seeking
apology and eliminating enmity is known as nanawati among Pashtuns and ‘uzr among other
communities. Even within the doctrine of Shari’a Law, this type of ‘blood money’ payment is
prevalent and is known as diyat. In respect to the Taliban’s prohibition of taking poar, the
Taliban are preventing a traditional practice among Pashtuns, Tajiks and other ethnic groups
in Afghanistan.
Apparently in anticipation of having Afghan government employees and others switch sides
and join the Taliban (likely as a response to the increase in US and Afghan government support
for reconciliation programmes for the Taliban and other insurgents), the 2010 code of conduct
has a series of new rules about handling such events or government desertions:
. ‘The people who surrender and regret their past deeds will have to return the money or
properties in case they have snatched the money or properties while they were working
with the infidels or their slavish government’23;
. ‘Those who quit the puppet government and join the mujahidin should not give him a place
in their lines until they develop satisfaction about the person. In case of giving a place to
such a person in their lines, the mujahidin will have to obtain the approval of the provincial
commander’24;
. ‘If a person quits the opposite camp and is unable to defend himself, it is not justified to kill
him until it is known if he plans to join the mujahidin or attack them.’25
Although there have not been reports of significant members of the Karzai regime or govern-
ment workers ‘switching sides’, a 16-man Afghan police unit recently defected to the Taliban in
Khogeyani, Ghazni, an explosive and unstable area southwest of Kabul.26 The mere fact that a
series of new rules addressing such a contingency was added to the 2010 Layeha is interesting in
its own right. It is probably an indication of the confidence that the Taliban had in early 2010 that
their side would eventually be victorious. These rules also might indicate the recognition by the
Taliban that Pashtuns have historically been very willing to change sides, especially if they think
a particular side will eventually be victorious.27



























During the last few years the Taliban have concentrated attacks, in part, on US and NATO
supply lines in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.28 We have recently witnessed considerable
concern in Washington concerning the intensity of Taliban attacks on coalition logistics and
supply convoys.29 The 2010 code of conduct explicitly addresses eventualities such as the
attack or capture of contractors and others involved in US/NATO convoys and logistics:
. ‘For those contractors who deliver and supply oil, resources, or other material, and build
governmental centers for the infidels or their slave administration . . . and drivers supplying
the enemy with goods who are captured, the death penalty should be pronounced if the
judge has solid proof in regard to their involvement.’30
The seriousness that the Taliban assign to supply convoys is reinforced by the penalty that
they ascribe to those proven guilty of being associated with convoy work: death. Like the 2009
Layeha, the 2010-reissued version has a special set of rules of conduct concerning construction
and logistics activities. The rules assign specific responsibility to Taliban leaders (provincial
authority only) who attack and seize contractors’ construction equipment or vehicles and
what to do with captured construction personnel. There are special instructions for Taliban fight-
ers not to capture and loot convoys for their own self-interests.
. ‘Burning a private vehicle which transports material to the infidels or provides other ser-
vices to the infidels is lawful but it is forbidden to spare them in exchange for money or use
them for any benefit’31;
. The Taliban ‘have the right to kill’ men who use ‘vehicles which transport material to the
infidels. The rules assign specific responsibility to Taliban leaders (Taliban Judge or in the
absence of a judge, a Provincial Shadow Governor).’32
The 2010 Layeha also published new rules concerning other construction and logistics
activities:
. ‘When it is confirmed that contractors . . . are transporting oil or other equipment . . . the
mujahidin should burn their resources and they (contractors) should be killed’33;
. ‘When it is confirmed [that] contractors are providing labourers and workers to the enemy
. . . [they] should also be killed.’34
These rules further suggest the importance that the Taliban place on logistics, convoys and
especially oil transport by the types of penalties proffered for those found supporting such activities.35
Both the 2009 and 2010 Layeha attempt to expand and reinforce the success the Taliban
shadow court system that represents a parallel legal system that is acknowledged by local com-
munities as being legitimate, fair, free of bribery and swift. The Taliban shadow justice system is
easily one of the most popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local com-
munities, especially in southern Afghanistan.36 One of the authors recently witnessed this first-
hand in the Panjwayi district of Kandahar where there exists no formal, functioning justice
system to adjudicate criminal cases or extremely important civil disputes involving water and
land rights. Disagreements over land (mezaka) and water are presently a serious source of
social instability in the district. Such disputes are quite frequent because of a complicated and
convoluted system of landownership and inheritance that has been aggravated by decades of vio-
lence and malfeasance by predatory local officials. Attempts to resolve these disputes or claims
through the channels of the Afghan Government’s formal justice system can take years and sig-
nificant bribes. The Taliban have effectively exploited of this situation through its shadow justice
system in Zangabad (Horn of Panjwayi).37 Using Shari’a law, a Taliban qazi (judge) can settle a
case in a few hours without bribes. While this court may not administer the kind of justice pre-
ferred by Kabul or the West, it is swift and perceived as just by most that use it. This is especially



























the case when property disputes are involved. Many villages as well as city dwellers, including
Kandahari businessmen,38 use the Taliban court to settle such land disputes. The shadow court
system actually gives a certain degree of legitimacy to the Taliban and strongly enhances their
political capital.39 The elders’ account of how the legal system is organized and how it functions
matches the 2010 Taliban code of conduct rule on justice exactly.
Organizational analysis of the Taliban movement: internal issues of the Mujahidin
Important information can be obtained regarding the organizational power structure of the contem-
porary Taliban movement through the examination of the new articles in the 2010 Layeha chapter
concerning ‘Internal Issues of the Mujahidin’. The Layeha identifies how the Taliban plan to
increase their efficiency and popularity in rural areas and zones of conflict by the creation of
walayat-kommsyon, so-called ‘provincial commissions’, which are investigative councils designed
to ensure the interests of the local population and maintain order within the Taliban’s provincial
force structure. Chapter 6, ‘About Commissions’ (Articles 34–39), and Chapter 7, ‘Internal Issues
of the Mujahidin’ (Articles 40, 41, 42–50, 58), and Chapter 11, ‘National Issues’ (Article 62), pre-
sents the Taliban’s method and process to create district-level commissions. According to this
article, the commissions are to be managed by a district governor and his deputy and are presented
as being critical in organizing and directing the Taliban’s activities at the village and district levels.
The Layeha advises provincial governors to help create these councils and seek out well-respected
leaders and deputies (not necessarily Taliban military commanders) who have the civil-service
skills necessary to promote the Taliban’s political and social causes.
Figure 1 is a pictorial presentation of organizational structure of the Taliban’s provincial-
level force structure based on an analysis of the Layeha chapters dedicated to the creation
and maintenance of the organization in question.
Figure 1. Provincial military force structure of the Afghan Taliban



























The Taliban’s vision of a provincial command-and-control structure is centred on five enti-
ties: the provincial governor; the provincial council; the Sharia court; the district commission;
and the district governor and his deputy. The provincial command-and-control infrastructure
remains loyal to and under the management of the hierarchal leadership of the Taliban Quetta
Shura, whose regional military council and respective rais-e-thazema (‘zonal chief’) relays stra-
tegic decisions and requests from Mullah Omar to the provincial leadership (Figure 1); Table 3
details the explicit responsibilities of the Taliban chain of command.
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that a primary purpose of the 2010 Layeha was to establish a series of
operational orders aimed at retaining discipline within the Taliban movement. The Layeha
also appears to be designed to assist in consolidating the movement in possible preparation
for the future withdrawal of international forces beginning in 2011. The document presents
Table 3. Responsibilities of the Taliban Chain of Commanda
Responsibilities of Taliban command-and-control apparatus
Zonal Chief Provincial Governor Provincial Commission District Governor
Has the authority to
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district governor, his
deputy, or a dilgai
commander.





Has the authority to




district governor. If a
disagreement ensues,
the case is then passed
to the zonal chief.
Made up of at least five
members, three of
which must be
present in their area at
all times.
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situation. If the
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resolve the issue, it
must be investigated
by the zonal chief.
Ensures no spies,
thieves or criminals




a monthly survey of
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being effective.
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rules, they must refer
this case to the
provincial council
who will investigate
the matter and consult
with the provincial
governor.
Note: a Based on Section 7, ‘Internal Issues of the Mujahideen’, rule 40, which details how the chain of command works
for the Taliban military force structure.



























specific instructions to be followed relative to political offers presented by the Kabul govern-
ment’s newly established ‘High Peace Council’ and other instruments involved in potential
reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban.
In summary, our analysis suggests that the Taliban remain most concerned with: chain of
command principles preventing the fragmentation of the various Taliban networks; obtaining
and maintaining public support by winning ‘hearts and minds’ of local residents;
ensuring enough fighters remain engaged in combat; and galvanizing the perception that the
Taliban represent a capable, desirable and fair alternative to the current Afghan political
establishment.
The content of the Taliban’s 2010 Layeha exposes specific weaknesses regarding the
Taliban movement: their obsession with group cohesion and consolidation, unifying the
command-and-control structure, issues concerning communications, and the difficulties the
top leadership (Mullah Omar and his Rahbari Shura) has co-ordinating fighters at the district
and provincial level from their safe-haven in Pakistan. Reissuing strictures that prohibit
group members from ‘taking money’ to forgive someone, ‘guaranteeing’ someone in
exchange for money or property, and outlawing the practice of kidnapping people for
money indicate that the Taliban leadership continues to worry about losing political
capital resulting from rank-and-file members engaged in criminal behaviour. Although the
Taliban represent a resilient and redundant organization, they may now find it challenging
to regenerate its rank and file as quickly as they did in the past due to an increase in Coalition,
Afghan and Pakistani military offensives of 2009–2011. This suggests that a major impli-
cation of the instructions that the 2010 Layeha directs at its provincial military force and dis-
trict-level chain of command is aimed at moderating what the Taliban leadership views as
improper behaviour. The code of conduct explicitly spells out the role and a heavy reliance
upon the provincial- and district-level commissions instructed to investigative the complaints
of the local population against local Taliban officials. The objective of this is to clearly con-
solidate the political legitimacy of the Taliban leadership by stemming the proliferation of
criminality among its commanders and foot soldiers. This is reinforced by instructions
related to ‘guerrilla fundamentals’ as well as Mullah Omar’s statement at the conclusion
of the Layeha that orders the Taliban to remain strategically concerned about the movement’s
perception among the local populace. The fact that protecting civilians and their property is a
tenet of Mullah Omar himself points to the ire that civilian casualties have caused the Taliban
among local communities.
Taliban factions are susceptible to tribal rifts, rivalries and conflicts, as much as any non-
insurgent Pashtun community is. This can mean the difference between safe haven and a
hostile environment in areas of operation intended for Taliban penetration and expansion.
Over 10 years have passed since the US-led attack against Afghanistan ended the Taliban’s
former regime, yet the Taliban fail to represent a plausible replacement to the current political
establishment – itself by no means a model candidate for state-building experiments.41
However, despite the Taliban’s effort to portray itself in a certain light – a structured, orderly
hierarchy with efficient information flow and doctrine – this does not realistically represent
the Taliban. The 2010 Layeha explicitly dictates the military chain of command, and political
commissions designed to hear the will of the people, but who ultimately refer back to a military
committee on the Quetta Shura for guidance. Clearly designed political and social mechanisms
– such as a hierarchal political and ideological committee or public services committee operat-
ing at the Quetta Shura – are not mentioned in the Layeha. In final analysis, our assessment
suggests that the Taliban are simply repeating the mistakes of the past, by focusing on military
objectives and intra-organizational functions whilst trying to capture the acquiescence of the
Afghan people by offering a rudimentary yet uneven level of justice.
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police truck (Filkins and Sahak 2010).
27. As Filkins and Sahak (2010) suggest: ‘In the decades of war in Afghanistan, armed groups, whether
fighting for the government or for someone else, have often changed sides to join the one they
believe is winning.’ Rule 14 of the 2010 Layeha states: ‘Those soldiers or police who surrender to
the mujahidin or repent will not be killed, and if these soldiers bring some weapons with them or
accomplish an achievement, then they should be praised.’
28. Associated Press, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Attack NATO Fuel Convoy, Killing 3’, New York Times, 23
Oct. 2010. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/asia/23briefs-ATTACK.html
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Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair-Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
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30. Rule 11 of 2010 Layeha.
31. Rule 19 of 2010 Layeha.
32. Rule 20 of 2010 Layeha.
33. Rule 25 of 2010 Layeha.
34. Rule 26 of 2010 Layeha.
35. Rules 15, 16 and 22 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 22 of 2010 Layeha.
36. During the authors’ recent research trips to Afghanistan in August/September of 2008, and May–June
2009 and July–September 2010, community leaders, village elders and ordinary citizens confirmed the
Taliban’s creation of this parallel legal system and its popularity. Interviews with elders suggested that
the shadow legal system organization and functions match the 2010 Taliban code of conduct rule on
justice exactly. Other analysts have reached similar conclusions: Carter and Clark (2010, pp. 20–
22) and Gopal (2010, pp. 7, 13).
37. Recently obtained information suggests that the Taliban Court might have moved from Zangabad to a
location in the Zhari District.
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39. ‘Maiwand Report; the Pride of Afghanistan’, Governance, Reconstruction, & Development, 20 June
2010, and Thomas H. Johnson interviews of Afghan citizenry in Panjwayi, Kandahar, August 2010.
40. Based on Section 7, ‘Internal Issues of the Mujahideen’, rule 40 details how the chain of command
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